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It is widely recognized among economists that a price on carbon emissions,
henceforth called a carbon tax1, is the most important policy instrument to
reduce such emissions. Standard economic reasoning also implies that in the
absence of other market failures, an appropriately set carbon price is the only
instrument needed to achieve an e¢ cient climate policy. However, it is widely
believed that in the real world there are many market failures associated with
energy markets and other climate related markets, suggesting that there is a
role for policy instruments in addition to a correct price on carbon emissions.
Market failures associated with knowledge creation are certainly important
in this respect, as it is di¢ cult to imagine a signi￿cant reduction in carbon
emissions during the coming decades without major technological changes.
Even ignoring market failures other than those directly associated with
carbon emissions, one may question the conventional wisdom that an carbon
tax will give an e¢ cient mitigation of carbon emissions. The conventional
wisdom is based on the ability of governments to commit to a future tax
path. In reality, this is not possible. Without commitment, market agents
who make investment decisions must base their decisions on what they ex-
pect about future climate policies. In a hypothetical world without any un-
certainty related to technology, preferences, etc. in the future, future carbon
taxes could be correctly predicted even in the absence of commitment. In
the real world these conditions obviously do not hold. As discussed in more
detail in section 6, non-commitment can therefore lead to uncertain and/or
wrong predictions about the future carbon tax.
In policy debates, it is often argued that lack of commitment may lead to
ine¢ ciently low emission reducing investments, and that emissions therefore
will be higher than they would be with commitment. For instance, Stern
(2007, p. 399) argues that "lack of certainty over the future pricing of the
1The price on carbon emissions could also be the price of carbon quotas; none of the
results in the paper depend on whether taxes or quotas are used as the policy instrument.
2carbon externality will reduce the incentive to innovate". This reasoning
implicitly argues that the carbon price uncertainty due to lack of commitment
has a similar e⁄ect on investments and emissions as the future carbon tax
being "too low"; a point that is explicitly made by Ulph and Ulph (2009).
Much of the discussion on the importance of expected future carbon taxes
on investments and hence on emissions ignores the fact that most CO2 emis-
sions are due to combustion of fossil fuels, which are scarce exhaustible re-
sources. For such resources, Sinclair (1992) pointed out that "the key decision
of those lucky enough to own oil-wells is not so much how much to produce
as when to extract it." More recently, this issue has received considerable
attention, often with reference to the so-called "green paradox"2. This term
stems from Sinn (2008a,b), who argues that some designs of climate pol-
icy, intended to mitigate carbon emissions, might actually increase carbon
emissions, at least in the short run. The reason for this possibility is closely
related to the insights given by Sinclair. Sinn￿ s point is that if e.g. a carbon
tax rises su¢ ciently rapidly, pro￿t maximizing resource owners will bring
forward the extraction of their resources. Hence, in the absence of carbon
capture and storage (CCS), near-term carbon emissions increase.
If lack of commitment has similar consequences as the future expected car-
bon tax being lower than under commitment, owners of the non-renewable
carbon resources will postpone extraction compared with the extraction path
they would have chosen had the policy makers been able to commit to the op-
timal price path. This argument suggests that it is not obvious whether near
term emissions will increase or decline as a consequence of lack of commit-
ment: If lack of commitment has similar consequences as the future carbon
tax being lower than a government would like to set if it could commit, there
2Contributions to this literature include Strand (2007), Grafton et al. (2010), Ger-
lagh (2010), Eichner and Pethig (2009), van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010), Hoel (2008,
2010). Earlier contributions making the link between climate policy and markets for non-
renewable resources include Ulph and Ulph (1994), Withagen (1994), Hoel and Kverndokk
(1996), Tahvonen (1997), Chakravorty et al. (2006, 2008).
3are two e⁄ects working in opposite direction: Low investments in emission re-
ducing capital tends to increase emissions, while postponed extraction works
in the opposite direction. Notice also that these two e⁄ects interact: Own-
ers of carbon resources are not only concerned about future carbon taxes,
but also about how large is the future demand for energy and the supply of
competing energy3. Similarly, ￿rms investing in energy saving technologies
or renewable energy care about what the future carbon tax will be, but also
about what the supply of fossil energy will be.
The present paper uses a simple two-period model of an aggregate econ-
omy to analyze how the expected future carbon tax may a⁄ect both emissions
and investments in substitutes for the carbon resource. Carbon capture and
storage is ignored, implying that emissions are identical to carbon extrac-
tion.4 Period 1 in the model may be interpreted as the near future where
one has reasonable con￿dence about the size of the carbon tax, with period
2 being the remaining future. In terms of the number of years, 5-15 years
might be a crude estimate of the length of period 1.
In period 1 the government ￿rst sets the carbon tax in period 1 and
announces its intended carbon tax for period 2. Once the tax is set, car-
bon resource owners and investors in mitigation capital simultaneously make
their choices of period 1 extraction and investment, respectively. Given the
outcome of period 1, the government sets the carbon tax for period 2, after
which the carbon resource owners decide how much to extract in this period.
There is no further investment in mitigation capital in period 2.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2-5 describe the
market equilibrium for exogenous carbon taxes in the two periods, and derives
the consequences of a change in the period 2 carbon tax rate. The formal
3This is studied in detail by Strand (2007), Gerlagh (2010), and van der Ploegh and
Withagen (2010)
4Discussions of climate policy when there is a possibility of CCS and when the carbon
resource scarcity is taken into considereation have been given by Amigues et al. (2010),
Le Kama et al. (2010) and Hoel and Jensen (2010).
4analysis in these sections is valid independently of whether the period 2
carbon tax rate is an actual tax rate that the government has committed to
or it is the tax rate that market agents expect will be implemented in period
2.
The results in section 5 depend on how sensitive extraction costs are
to total carbon extraction. If there is no physical scarcity of the resource
and extraction costs only rise weakly with accumulated extraction, a higher
future carbon tax implies lower near-term emissions and higher investments
in the non-carbon substitute. On the other hand, near-term emissions will
be higher the higher is the future carbon tax rate if extraction costs rise
rapidly with accumulated extraction. Whether investments in the substitute
are increasing or declining in the future carbon tax rate will in this case
depend on the time pro￿le of the returns to the investment. If most of the
returns to the investments come in the near future, investments are declining
in the expected future carbon tax, while the opposite is true if most of the
returns to the investments come in the more distant future.
Section 6 introduces the government￿ s preferences related to climate change,
and derives the optimal tax rates for the two periods for the case of commit-
ments. This section also gives a discussion of why lack of commitment will
make the future tax rate be uncertain, with an expected value that might
di⁄er from the optimal tax rate under commitment.
The actual carbon tax rate for period 2 is set in period 2. This tax rate
will depend on decisions made in period 1, which in turn depends on what
tax rate market agents expected for period 2 when they made their decisions
in period 1. Climate costs are assumed to depend on resource extraction
in both periods, and in section 7 it is shown that equilibrium climate costs
will depend on the expectations about the period 2 tax rate that market
agents had in period 1. Climate costs may be increasing or declining in this
expected tax rate, depending of key parameters in the model.
As mentioned above, it is often argued that lack of commitment may give
5lower investments in energy e¢ cient technologies or renewable energy than
one would get with commitment. This may be an argument for an investment
subsidy, as suggested by Ulph and Ulph (2009). With this motivation, section
8 studies the consequences of an investment subsidy. It is shown that an
investment subsidy always increases investments, while the e⁄ect on near-
term emissions is ambiguous. Equilibrium climate costs will decline as a
response to the subsidy, unless most of the returns to the investments come
in period 1 and early emissions are considerable more harmful to the climate
than later emissions.
Section 9 concludes.
2 The market for the general purpose good
Carbon is used as an input in production of a general purpose good in both
periods. The output is increasing in the carbon input and also in a capital
good that is a substitute for carbon energy. An obvious interpretation is
that there is a substitute that has high capital costs and low operating costs
(such as hydro, wind, and solar energy). Once the investment in capacity of
such a substitute is made, it will be operated at full capacity. Alternatively,
one could think of the substitute as knowledge capital, i.e. an improved
technology that is available at a low cost once it has been developed.
Output in the two periods is ~ f(x;I) and ~ F(X;I), where x is carbon
extracted and used in period 1 and X is carbon extracted and used in period
2. The variable I is the investment in the carbon substitute, which takes
place only in period 1. This investment is assumed to a⁄ect output in both
periods, with either ~ fI or ~ FI being zero as special cases. The functions ~ f
and ~ F are assumed to be concave and increasing in both arguments, and it
is also assumed that the cross derivatives ~ fxI and ~ FXI are negative, so that
the marginal productivity of using the carbon resource is lower the higher is
the capital good I.
6The price of the general purpose good is normalized to 1, while the price
of the carbon resource that the producers of the general purpose good must
pay in the two periods is p+q and P +Q, respectively. Here p and P are the
prices that the producers of the carbon resource receive in the two periods,
while q and Q are the carbon taxes in the two periods. Investment in the
carbon substitute uses the general purpose good, and the cost of one unit of
I is c(I).5 Finally, the exogenous discount factor is ￿ (equal to (1 + r)￿1;
where r is the exogenous discount rate).
Producers of the general purpose good take the resource price in period
1 and 2 as given ( p + q and P + Q, respectively) and maximize
~ f(x;I) ￿ (p + q)x ￿ cI + ￿
h
~ F(X;I) ￿ (P + Q)X
i
The maximization gives
~ fx(x;I) ￿ (p + q) = 0 (1)
~ FX(X;I) ￿ (P + Q) = 0 (2)
~ fI(x;I) + ￿ ~ FI(X;I) ￿ c
0(I) = 0 (3)
3 The market for the carbon resource
To extract the carbon resource one needs to use the all purpose good as an
input. The input needed per ton of the resource extracted is assumed to be in-
dependent of the extraction rate, but increases with accumulated extraction.
A special case of this is the case of a constant unit cost of extraction combined
with an absolute upper limit ￿ A on accumulated extraction x+X. The general
speci￿cation is frequently used in the resource literature, see e.g. Heal (1976)
and Hanson (1980). Formally, let each unit of the resource be indexed by a
continuos variable z, and let g(z) be the cost of of extracting unit z, with
5With the interpretation of I as investment in the capacity to produce a substitute,
c(I) includes the present value of the operating costs of the substitute at full capacity.
7g0 ￿ 0. In the two-period model x is extraction in period 1, and X is extrac-
tion in period 2. The cost of extracting x is thus given by G(x) =
R x
0 g(z)dz,







G(x + X) ￿ G(x). Notice that these relationships imply that G0(x) = g(x)
and G0(x + X) = g(x + X). The limiting case of a constant unit cost g
of extraction up to an exogenous limit ￿ A would imply that G(x) = gx and
G(x+X)￿G(x) = gX (with X having an upper limit of ￿ A￿x). In the subse-
quent analysis it is assumed that g0(z) = 0 for z ￿ ~ z and g0(z) > 0 for z > ~ z,
and that x < ~ z < x+X for all relevant values of x and X.6 This implies that
g0(x) = 0, while G0(x+X) = g(x+X) > g(x) and G00(x+X) = g0(x+X) > 0;
g0(x + X) is henceforth denoted g0.
Producers of the carbon resource maximize
px ￿ G(x) + ￿ [PX ￿ (G(x + X) ￿ G(x))]
This gives (using G0(x) = g(x) and G0(x + X) = g(x + X))
p ￿ g(x) = ￿ [P ￿ g(x)] (4)
and
P = g(x + X) (5)
Using ￿ = (1 + r)￿1, this equation implies that
P ￿ p = r(p ￿ g(x))
This is simply the Hotelling rule, which formulated this way also holds for
the extraction cost assumption we are using.
6This simplifying assumption is not important for the results.
84 The market equilibrium
Equations (1)-(5) are 5 equations determining the 5 variables p;P;x;X;I as
functions of the exogenous tax rates q and Q. Eliminating p and P, the
market equilibrium (1)-(5) may be rewritten as
~ fx ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)g(x) ￿ ￿g(x + X) ￿ q = 0 (6)
~ FX ￿ g(x + X) ￿ Q = 0 (7)
~ fI + ￿ ~ FI ￿ c
0 = 0 (8)
These equations are of course also the ￿rst order conditions to the problem
of maximizing the total private sector pro￿ts given by
￿(x;X;I;q;Q) =
h





~ F(X;I) ￿ (G(x + X) ￿ G(x)) ￿ QX
i
which is concave in (x;X;I) since ~ f, ~ F, ￿G(x + X) and ￿(1 ￿ ￿)G(x) are
concave.
If the government could commit to a tax rate Q in the future, both tax
rates q and Q would be known when decisions are made for the ￿rst period.
In the ￿rst period the variables x and I are decided upon, while X has
the status of a planned variable for the resource owners, and an expected
variable for the other agents. However, as long as the future tax rate Q and
other exogenous variables are not changed when period 2 arrives, the planned
extraction in period 2 will be the extraction that actually will occur.
Without commitment about the future tax rate, Q is the tax rate that
agents expect in period 2. When period 2 arrives, x, I and p are all histor-
ically determined, while P and X will be determined by (2) and (5). If Q
9turns out to be di⁄erent from what agents expected in period 1, P will also
be di⁄erent from what agents expected, and X will be di⁄erent from what
agents planned.
The next section discusses how the equilibrium depends on the tax rate
Q. The formal analysis is valid independently of whether Q is set already
in period 1 or Q is what agents expect the future tax rate to be. However,
in section 6 it is argued that governments in practise cannot commit to tax
rates far into the future, implying that Q should be interpreted as the tax
rate that agents expect in period 2. In section 6 it is also argued that there
may be good reasons for private agents to expect a future tax rate that di⁄ers
from the tax rate that the present government plans to set.
5 The e⁄ects of a change in the expected fu-
ture carbon tax
This section describes how changes in Q a⁄ect x and I. Derivations using
the general functions ~ f(x;I) and ~ F(X;I) give ambiguous results that are
not easy to interpret. In particular, the results will depend on how close
a substitute I is for x and X, i.e. on the size of ~ fIx and ~ FIX, which are
assumed negative. One limiting case is ~ fxI = ~ FXI = 0. In this case the
market for I (described by (8)) is completely independent of the market for
the resource (described by (6) and (7)). For this case all results are trivial,
and not considered any more in the present paper.
A second limiting case, which the proceeding formal analysis focuses on, is
the case in which the capital good I is a perfect substitute for the resource. If
I is a perfect substitute for x and X, x and I must enter linearly in ~ f , so that
~ f(x;I) = f(x+aI), and similarly for X and I, so that ~ F(X;I) = F(X+bI).
By a suitable choice in the units I is measured in, we can set a + b = 1, so
the functions become
10~ f(x;I) = f(x + aI)
~ F(X;I) = F(X + (1 ￿ a)I)
The parameter a tells us what share of the total returns to investment are
obtained already during period 1. It is perhaps easiest to interpret a by
considering the limiting cases of a = 0 and a = 1. If a = 0 the investment
gives no payo⁄ in period 1. This could be interpreted as the time lag from
the investment decision till the investment is completed and contributes to
production being at least as long as the time period for which commitment
to a speci￿c carbon tax rate is assumed. The opposite limiting case of a = 1
could be interpreted as the case of an investment in a capital good that
depreciates rapidly, so that it only contributes to production for the time
period for which commitment to a speci￿c carbon tax rate is assumed. The
more general cases of a 2 (0;1) are intermediate between the two limiting
cases. Notice that the size of a will not only depend on properties of the
capital good: The longer one assumes the period is for which the government
can commit to a speci￿c tax rate, the larger will a be.
The assumption that a is an exogenous parameter that does not depend
on carbon taxes and other economic variables re￿ ects a limitation of the
present analysis I will return to in section 9: The analysis is limited to how
total investment in a substitute may depend on carbon taxes and carbon tax
expectations, and not on how the composition of such investments may be
a⁄ected.
With the speci￿cation above the market equilibrium(1)-(5) may be rewrit-
11ten as
f
0(x + aI) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)g(x) ￿ ￿g(x + X) ￿ q = 0 (10)
F
0(X
e + (1 ￿ a)I) ￿ g(x + X) ￿ Q = 0 (11)
af
0(x + aI) + ￿(1 ￿ a)F
0(X + (1 ￿ a)I) ￿ c
0 = 0 (12)
This gives three equations to determine the three variables x, X and I as
functions of q and Q. Just as in the general case, these equations are also the
￿rst order conditions to the problem of maximizing the total private sector
pro￿ts given by
￿(x;X;I;q;Q) = [f(x + aI) ￿ G(x) ￿ I ￿ qx] (13)
+￿ [F(X + (1 ￿ a)I) ￿ (G(x + X) ￿ G(x)) ￿ QX]
which is concave in (x;X;I) since f, F, ￿G(x + X) and ￿(1 ￿ ￿)G(x) are
concave.
Di⁄erentiating the three equations (10), (11) and (12) with respect to Q
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where H = ￿jMj > 0 due to the concavity of the function ￿ de￿ned by
(13).
It is easily veri￿ed that both these derivatives have ambiguous signs. In
particular, the signs depend on the sizes of a and g0; in the Appendix the
following result is shown:
Proposition 1 The e⁄ects of a change in the future carbon tax rate on
present decisions about resource extraction and investments in a substitute
depend on a and g0 in a way described by Figure 1, where a￿ =
￿F00
f00+￿F00 and





A ("small g0 ") ￿ +
B ("intermediate g0 or small a") + +
C ("large g0 and large a") + ￿
Figure 1 about here
To interpret this result, it is useful ￿rst to consider regions B and C.
In both of these cases we ￿nd the "standard" green paradox result that a
higher future carbon tax shifts extraction from the future to the present.
Investments where most of the returns come in period 1 (large a) therefore
get a lower payo⁄due to increased extraction of the resource, implying lower
investment (region C). On the other hand, investments where most of the re-
turns come in period 2 (small a) get a higher payo⁄due to reduced extraction
of the resource in period 2, implying higher investment (region B).
13Region A is characterized by g0 being small. This means that there is
no strong relationship between extraction in the two periods. In particular,
g0 = 0 would imply that extraction decisions in period 1 were completely
independent of extraction plans for period 2. As before, a higher carbon tax
in the future tends to reduce future extraction. However, when g0 is small
the direct e⁄ect of this on period 1 extraction is small. Investments, on the
other hand, become more pro￿table due to the reduced future extraction, as
long as some of the returns to the investment accrue in period 2 (a < 1). But
if these increased investments also reduce demand for the resource in period
1 ( a > 0), this tends to reduce extraction in period 1.
6 The social optimum and the role of com-
mitment
All of the analysis to now has considered arbitrarily given tax rates, and the
e⁄ects of changing the (expected) future tax rate. In this section I discuss
how the social optimum may be achieved by using appropriate carbon taxes
in the two periods, and what role the possibility of commitment may have
for achieving the social optimum. The analysis of the present section starts
with a discussion of how the emissions in the two periods a⁄ect total climate
costs.
Due to the time lag of the climate system, the e⁄ect of emissions in period
1 on the climate in period 1 is assumed to be negligible; this is certainly true
if the length of period 1 is no longer than about 5-15 years. Climate costs are
therefore assumed to depend on the temperature increase in period 2 (from
some base level). The temperature increase will depend on emissions in both
periods. According to Allen et al. (2009), the peak temperature increase due
to greenhouse gas emissions is approximately independent of the timing of
emissions. In the framework of the present model, peak temperature increase
thus depends only on x+X. However, we would expect this peak temperature
14increase to occur earlier the more of the emissions occur at an early stage. It
also seems reasonable to expect climate costs to be higher the more rapidly
the temperature increases, for a given peak temperature increase. Hence,
it seems reasonable to assume that climate costs are increasing in the two
variables x and X, with x having a stronger marginal impact on climate costs
than X. A simple way of capturing this it to assume that climate costs are
given by a function D(￿x + X), where D0 > 0 and ￿ > 1.7
Given this climate cost function, the social optimum is found by maxi-
mizing
W = ~ f(x;I)￿G(x)￿c(I)+￿
h




The optimum conditions for the three variables x;X;I are
~ fx ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)g(x) ￿ ￿g(x + X) ￿ ￿￿D
0 = 0 (18)
~ FX ￿ g(x + X) ￿ D
0 = 0 (19)
~ fI + ￿ ~ FI ￿ c
0 = 0 (20)
Comparing these equations with (6)-(8) it immediately follows that the
market outcome coincides with the social optimum if
q = ￿￿D
0(￿x + X) (21)
Q = D
0(￿x + X) (22)






7A slightly more general function ~ D(x;x + X), increasing in both arguments, would
make derivations slightly more complex without adding anything of substance.
15Since ￿ > 1; the optimal carbon tax thus rises at a rate lower than the rate
of interest (= 1 + r = ￿
￿1).
If taxes for both periods were set already in period 1 according to (21) and
(22), with the equilibrium values of x and X inserted from (6)-(8), the social
optimum would be achieved. Moreover, if the government reoptimized in the
beginning of period 2, i.e. maximized W taking x and I as given, there would
be no change in the optimal tax in period 2. Whether or not it is possible to
commit to a future tax rate is thus irrelevant in the present model as long
as all kinds of uncertainties are ignored. Before turning to possible sources
of uncertainties, it is useful brie￿ y to see how relatively small changes in the
present model would make the issue of commitment more important.
In the present model all market participants are price takers. If instead
the ￿rms investing in the substitute were so large that they realized that
their investment decisions could in￿ uence the future tax rate in the case of
no commitment, there would be a di⁄erence between the case of commitment
and no commitment, see e.g. Ulph and Ulph (2009) for a further discussion.8
Any market failure (in addition to the climate externality) preventing the
￿rst-best social optimum from being achievable might also make the issue
of commitment more important. Consider e.g. a market failure implying
that investment in the substitute is lower than in the social optimum, even
if carbon taxes are given by (21) and (22). In the case of commitment, the
government might want to partly correct this market failure through choosing
tax rates that deviate from (21) and (22). However, without commitment it
would be optimal to set the second period tax according to (22) once period 2
arrived. If this were foreseen by market participants in period 1, there would
thus be a di⁄erence in the outcome under commitment and no commitment.
This issue is discussed in more detail by Golombek et al. (2010) for the case
of investment in period 1 being R&D.
8A similar point is made by Requate (2005) for R&D investments by an innovator that
is so large than it may in￿ uence future tax rates.
16Finally, a regulatory failure in period 1 implying that the tax in period
1 cannot be set as high as its optimal value would generally imply that if it
were possible to commit, the optimal tax in period 2 would di⁄er from the
rate implied by (22). As in the reasoning above, reoptimization in period 2
would generally give a tax di⁄ering from the original tax rate. If this were
foreseen by market participants in period 1, there would also in this case be
a di⁄erence in the outcome under commitment and no commitment.
While all of the issues above are important in the real world, they are
ignored in the present analysis. Instead, the focus is on various types of
uncertainties, implying that market participants cannot predict future tax
rates with certainty, given that the government cannot commit to a speci￿c
future tax rate. There are several sources of such uncertainties in the real
world. Three sources that immediately come to mind in the context of the
climate issue are uncertainties related to technological development, uncer-
tainties related to the preferences of future governments, and uncertainties
related to the development of international climate cooperation. Clearly, op-
timal future carbon taxes are going to depend on the development of all these
factors.
Consider in particular the case of uncertain future political preferences,
given by the climate cost function.9 Let D(￿x+X) be the preferences of the
period 1 government, while the preferences of the period 2 government are
given by ￿D(￿x + X), where ￿ is uncertain in period 1.10 A full treatment
of the market equilibrium treating ￿ as a random variable is beyond the
scope of the present analysis. What is important is that the expectations
market participants have about ￿ will be an important factor determining
what the agents believe about the future carbon tax, assumed to be given
by an equation corresponding to (22), i.e. Q = ￿D0(￿x + X). Notice in
9Even if preferences regarding climate change were known with certainty, the function
D decribing the relationship between emissions and climate costs could be uncertain due
to uncertainty related to the climate e⁄ects of emissions.
10A similar speci￿cation is used by Ulph and Ulph (2009).
17particular that even if agents have a subjective probability distribution over
￿ satisfying E￿ = 1, the expected future tax will, due to non-linearities,
generally di⁄er from what the expected price would have been with ￿ = 1 for
certain. Moreover, there is no reason why E￿ = 1. If the present government
is considered to give climate issues high priority compared with potential
other governments, E￿ < 1 would be more plausible. This may give an
expected value of Q that is lower than what the present government considers
as optimal.
The next section considers the situation from the perspective of the period
1 government with preferences D(￿x + X). Given these preferences, it is of
interest to see what the consequences are of Q di⁄ering from the optimal
value given by (22), given that the present government will be in power also
in period 2, and thus set the actual carbon tax according to (22).
7 Climate costs and carbon tax expectations
Assume that the carbon policy is set optimally in period 2, no matter how x
and I are determined in period 1. Letting as before Q denote the carbon tax
in period 2 that was expected in period 1, the actual value of X follows from
maximizing W (given by (17)) taking x(Q) and I(Q) as given. This gives
F


















where J = D00 +g0 ￿F 00 > 0. Total climate costs depends on ￿x+X, and it








00)]Kx + (1 ￿ a)F
00KIg (24)
18where Kx and KI are given by (15) and (16), respectively.
The term in front of Kx is positive (since ￿ > 1), while the term in
front of KI is negative. If Kx and KI have opposite signs, dD
@Q is therefore
unambiguously signed. From Proposition 1 the following therefore follows:
Proposition 2 The e⁄ects of a change in the expected future carbon tax rate
on climate costs, given that the actual future carbon tax rate is set optimally,
depend on a and g0 in the way described by Figure 1, where a￿ =
￿F00
f00+￿F00 and







A ("small g0 ") ￿ + ￿
B ("intermediate g0 or small a") + + ?
C ("large g0 and large a") + ￿ +
Going back to equation (24), we see that both the numerator and the
denominator contain terms with (g0)2. For g0 su¢ ciently high, these terms
in the numerator will dominate other terms. The part of the numerator con-
taining (g0)2 is ￿(￿ ￿ 1)[a2f00 + ￿(1 ￿ a)2F 00 ￿ c00](g0)2. The term in square
brackets is negative no matter what value a has, implying that the whole ex-
pression is positive since ￿ > 1. We therefore have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If the actual future carbon tax rate is set optimally, climate
costs are increasing in the expected carbon tax for g0 su¢ ciently large, no
matter what value a has.
Notice that this result follows immediately from ￿ > 1 for the limiting
case of x + X being exogenous, since @x
@Q > 0 in this case.
Intuitively, one might think that expectations about a high future carbon
tax are good for the climate. This may be true, and Proposition 2 shows that
it is certainly true for values of a and g0 in Region A of Figure 1. However, if
g0 is su¢ ciently high we get the opposite result: Expectations about a high
future carbon tax are bad for the climate.
198 The e⁄ects of subsidizing investments in
the carbon substitute
In several countries, in particular in the EU, there are substantial subsidies
o⁄ered to investments in renewable energy and energy saving capital. One
reason that is often given for such subsidies is the assumed lack of con￿-
dence among private agents in a high future carbon tax (or quota price).
An obvious question is whether a subsidy to the carbon substitute actually
reduces climate costs. To investigate this, let private investment costs now
be c(I) ￿ sI, where s is an investment subsidy. Di⁄erentiating the three




















































LI > 0 (26)
While I for sure increases as a response to a subsidy, the e⁄ect of an invest-
ment subsidy on x is ambiguous. In particular, the sign of @x
@s depend on the
sizes of a and g0; in the Appendix the following result is shown:
Proposition 4 An investment subsidy increases investment, while the e⁄ect
on resource extraction in period 1 depends on a and g0 in the way described by
Figure 2, where a￿ =
￿F00






D ("large a") ￿ +
E ("small a") + +
Figure 2 about here
The e⁄ect of an investment subsidy on climate costs, assuming the climate









00)]Lx + (1 ￿ a)F
00LIg (27)
where Lx and LI are given by (25) and (26), respectively.
The term in front of Lx is positive (since ￿ > 1), while the sign in front
of LI is negative. If Lx and LI have opposite signs, dD
@s is therefore unam-
biguously signed. From Proposition 4 the following therefore follows that
dD
ds < 0 in Region D of Figure 2. As for region E, the following is shown in
the Appendix:
Proposition 5 Given that the actual future carbon tax rate is set optimally,
the e⁄ect of an investment subsidy on climate costs depend on a, g0 and ￿ in
a way described by Figure 2, where a￿ =
￿F00
f00+￿F00 and the two regions D and







D ("large a ") ￿ + ￿
E ("small a ") and small ￿ + + ￿
E ("small a ") and large ￿ + + +
An investment subsidy is thus good for the climate if a is large or ￿ is
small. However, it is bad for the environment if a is small and ￿ is large.
The interpretation of this is that if a is small, encouraging investment will
21reduce demand for the resource in the future considerably more than in the
present. Resource owners therefore speed up extraction. If climate costs
are su¢ ciently strongly a⁄ected by shifting emissions from the future to the
preset, climate costs therefore increase.
9 Concluding remarks
An obvious problem with implementing an optimal climate policy is that
policy makers cannot commit to a high future carbon tax. In the policy
debate on climate policies it is often argued that long-run investments in
greenhouse gas mitigation may be smaller than desirable since investors fear
that future carbon prices will be lower than currently announced by policy
makers. The present paper shows that it is not obvious how expectations
about future carbon taxes a⁄ect important variable such as investments in
non-carbon energy and near-term emissions. .
The e⁄ects of expectations about future carbon taxes on near-term emis-
sions and investments in substitutes for carbon energy depend signi￿cantly
on how rapidly extraction costs increase with increasing total extraction. In
addition, the time pro￿le of the returns to the investment in the non-carbon
substitute is important for the e⁄ects of expectations about future carbon
taxes.
The analysis is based on an extremely simple model. Only two periods
are considered, instead of a more general model with several periods or with
continuous time. The assumption about commitment therefore was quite
rigid: Market agents know the carbon tax with certainty in the ￿rst period,
while they must guess on the tax in period 2. In reality, the degree of un-
certainty about the carbon tax or any other price will typically be increasing
gradually over time. Similarly, policy makers ability to commit is not an
either or issue, but rather how strongly they can commit. It seems plausible
that commitment is weaker the further into the future we look.
22The model is highly aggregated. There is only one type of carbon resource
in the model. In reality, there are quite large di⁄erences between coal, oil
and natural gas. In particular, the degree of physical scarcity of the resource,
captured by g0 in the formal model, probably di⁄ers considerably between
di⁄erent types of fossil fuels. Similarly, there is only one type of investment
in the model, with a given time pro￿le of returns. In reality there are many
types of emission reducing investments, di⁄ering along many dimensions,
including the time pro￿le of returns. We would therefore expect a change in
the expectations about future tax rates to have di⁄erent e⁄ects on di⁄erent
investment.
In spite of the shortcomings of the formal model, I believe the analysis
gives an important insight: An key message is that in any analysis of dynamic
e⁄ects of carbon taxes, investment subsidies and other mitigation policies, it
is crucial to take the supply side of fossil fuel markets into consideration.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The signs of the derivatives (15) and (16) are equal to the signs of Kx and
KI, respectively.
Consider ￿rst Kx. This function is increasing in g0 and quadratic in a. It
is zero for g0 = a = 0 and for g0 = 1￿a = 0. The ￿rst term in the expression
for Kx is negative (for 0 < a < 1), while the second term (including the
minus sign) is positive. The second term will dominate if g0 is su¢ ciently
large. However, for g0 su¢ ciently small there will be a range of a-values
giving Kx < 0. By setting Kx = 0 we can ￿nd the combinations of a and
g0 that separate the area for Kx < 0 and Kx > 0. These combinations are
given by the line ‘ in Figure 1: When Kx = 0 each value of a 2 (0;1) will
give some positive value of g0, with a particular value of a giving the highest
possible value of g0consistent with Kx = 0. Since Kx is increasing in g0, it
23follows that Kx < 0 in region A in Figure 1, while Kx > 0 in region B.
Consider next KI. This function is declining in a. Moreover, for any
value of g0 there exists a value of a giving KI = 0. It is straightforward to
see that this value is
^ a(g
0) =
f00F 00 ￿ ￿F 00g0
f00F 00 + (￿f00 ￿ ￿F 00)g0
which approaches a￿ as g0 ! 1. Since KI is declining in a, it follows that
KI > 0 for combinations of g0 and a satisfying a < ^ a(g0), illustrated as region
B in Figure 1. Similarly, KI < 0 for combinations of g0 and a satisfying
a > ^ a(g0), illustrated as region C in Figure 1. The borderline between these
two regions in denoted m in Figure 1.
In Figure 1, the curves ‘ and m don￿ t intersect for any positive value of g0.
The reason for this is that Kx > 0 to the right of the curve m, or, alternatively
stated, KI ￿ 0 implies Kx > 0: if KI = (1￿a)f00F 00+[af00 ￿ (1 ￿ a)￿F 00]g0 ￿
0, it follows that ￿a(1 ￿ a)f00F 00 ￿ a2f00g0 + a(1 ￿ a)￿F 00g0 ￿ 0. But Kx is
larger than the l.h.s. of the last inequality, implying that Kx > 0.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 4
The term Lx is declining in a. Moreover, for any value of g0 there exists a




f00F 00 + (￿f00 ￿ ￿F 00)g0
which is increasing in g0 and approaches a￿ as g0 ! 1. Since Lx is declining
in a, it follows that Lx < 0 for combinations of g0 and a satisfying a > ~ ￿(g0),
illustrated as region D in Figure 2. Similarly, Lx > 0 for combinations of g0
and a satisfying a < ~ ￿(g0), illustrated as region E in Figure 2. The borderline
between these two regions in denoted n in Figure 2.
24This concludes the proof of Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5
The term Lx is positive in region E. The term [(￿ ￿ 1)g0 ￿ ￿F 00)]Lx will
therefore dominate the term (1 ￿ a)F 00LI in (27) if ￿ is su¢ ciently large.
Hence, the whole expression in (27) will be positive in this case.













ds < 0 also for small but positive values of ￿.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.
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